In the fall of 1991, George Bush saw his own attorneygeneral defeated in an off-year Pennsylvania senatorial race. Richard Thornburgh, once a popular governor, fell victim to attacks by Harris Wofford, an aging, politically inexperienced, unabashedly liberal college professor. The Democrats succeeded in a state that had rejected their candidates in every Senate election since 1962.
Although the differences between the politics of foreign and domestic policy seldom reveal themselves this dramatically, they have been enduring features of American politics. At the same time, the distinctions between the foreign and domestic arenas faded during the years following the Vietnam war. The loss of Vietnam and the scandal named Watergate subverted executive authority. Control of the legislative and executive branches was usually divided between the two political parties. The parties themselves became internally more homogeneous and increasingly differentiated from one another. Foreign policy issues seemed to be completely absorbed into domestic disputes.
These changes raised key questions concerning the conduct of the nation's foreign policy. Had partisanship become so intense it no longer stopped at the water's edge? Had a prolonged period of almost continuous divided government handicapped the president's capacity to formulate foreign policy? Had the congressional role in the making of foreign policy been so enhanced that the differences between the making of foreign and domestic policy been all but obliterated?
It is the burden of my argument that the changes in American politics during the post-Vietnam era did not eliminate the distinction between foreign and domestic political arenas -primarily because the nature of the international system precludes it. To respond to external threats, the United States needs a relatively centralized, coordinated foreign policy-making system. Because of this international reality, presidents remain the most potent political force in the making of foreign policy.
Though Congress began to play a more important role in the years following the Vietnam war, especially when the executive's capacity to defend the national interest was diminished, the primary locus of decision making remained in presidential hands. As Bush's foreign policy triumphs illustrated, the presidency continued to be the dominant foreign policy-making institution. For all of Capitol Hill's increased involvement, it still remained a secondary political player. Conflict between the branches remained more contained than has been generally realized.
A HARD TEST
The United States is, in some respects, the last place one would look for international constraints on the making of foreign policy. According to a number of theorists, the international system is expected to have a greater effect on the foreign policy making of small nations compared to large ones, on the choices of weak nations compared to strong ones, and on economically dependent nations compared to economically self-sufficient ones.4 Theorists also expect policy making to be centralized in the hands of the executive when external threats are immediate rather than distant.5 If these are correct estimates of the occasions when international constraints are greatest, then the postwar United States is a hard case, where external constraints are least likely to be controlling. As a large nation well endowed with natural resources enjoying the world's largest and most self-sufficient economy and containing the world's most powerful military arsenal, the United States was, of all nations, the one best able to compel others to act in accord with its wishes and the one least likely to be subject to constraints imposed by the external environment. If any nation-state can ignore external pressures, it was the richest and most powerful one. Thus, if one discovers that processes within the United States are constrained by external forces, then it is very likely that these constraints are quite general.
It is possible but unlikely that small countries have greater latitude on security questions than do large, powerful ones. It could be argued that they can do as they please and "free ride" on the more powerful. But free riders must be acquiescent riders; they can hardly let domestic politics interfere with the demands more powerful countries might place upon them.
Admittedly, the United States was not free of external threats during the cold war. Some may argue that it was particularly constrained by its need to protect the interests of the free world. Once the United States spread its economic, military, and nuclear umbrella, it was much more constrained than smaller nations who could free ride under U.S. protection. But if the cold war constrained U.S. choices, it was no more constrained than other countries. Soviet expansion had to be contained, the possibility of sudden nuclear warfare was frightening, and revolutionary movements supported by the Soviet Union and motivated by communist ideology seemed threatening. Though the United States was the dominant figure in world politics, it hardly felt secure. But the precariousness of the international environment during the cold war was little different from the instabilities of earlier epochs. Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Bodin took a threatening international environment for granted. Wars and rumors of wars marked most of the twentieth century -though the United States sometimes pretended that it could ignore them. Indeed, the bipolar conflict of the cold war was more predictable and more manageable than the multipolar conflicts that preceded it.6 Hardly before the cold war has come to an end, serious students of international relations became nostalgic about the regularities of bipolarity.7
Not only have the external constraints on the foreign policy choices of the United States been less than those facing other nations, but its constitutional framework makes it particularly difficult for U.S. foreign policy to be centrally led by a strong executive.8 By separating the government into three branches, the Constitution insured that a wide variety of groups and interests would participate in decisionmaking processes. And by assigning most of the governing authority to a Congress divided between a Senate and a House, the Constitution further facilitated the intrusion of parochial considerations into the making of foreign policy.
The weakness of the presidency on issues of foreign policy within the U.S. constitutional framework is not always appreciated. The Con- pardons, and "execute" the laws of Congress. Admittedly, the president is also assigned the responsibility of commander-in-chief, but no specific powers are granted along with this responsibility and the Constitution quite specifically grants to Congress the authority to declare war, raise an army, and prepare for the common defense. The presidential powers to appoint ambassadors and make treaties are shared with the Senate. The president can veto congressional legislation, but this negative power can be overridden by a two-thirds vote in both Houses. Finally and ultimately, Congress can remove a president from office, but the reverse is not true. Thus, there is little in the U.S. constitutional framework that encourages executive dominance of the foreign policy-making system.
Over the past twenty-five years, the power of the presidency in foreign affairs has been especially weakened by two events that undermined executive branch credibility. The president and his advisers, who had in the decades since World War II enjoyed the enormous prestige that comes from winning a world war, were humiliated in Vietnam by their inability to resolve to their country's satisfaction a conflict with an underdeveloped nation. Simultaneously, a set of illegal and unconstitutional political practices by the executive were exposed as part of the Watergate scandal. For the first time in American history, a president was almost impeached and was forced to resign from office. Under the circumstances, Congress could no longer be expected to defer to executive expertise, the news media could be expected to hunt for presidential peccadillos, and the public could be expected to become distrustful of the country's political leadership.
Divided partisan control of the legislative and executive branches of government further undermined the basis for a consensual, executive-led foreign policy-making system. The Democratic party controlled the House of Representatives for all but four years during the postwar period and the Senate for all but ten of these years. Meanwhile, until the election of Bill Clinton, the Republican party had won the presidency in every election since 1968, save for the very close election of Jimmy Carter immediately after the Watergate crisis. The ethnic heterogeneity and decentralized internal structure of the Democratic party made it a very effective organization for winning congressional elections, while the more homogeneous, centrally directed Republican party made it more suitable for electing presidents. The Democratic party had the advantage of holding the more popular position on economic and social issues that tended to influence the outcome of congressional elections, while the Republican party had the political advantage on foreign policy and cultural issues that often played an important role in presidential politics.9 The leaders of each party -presidential in the Republican case, congressional in the Democratic -had a vested interest in perpetuating the institutional structure and issue orientation that helped it remain in power within its institutional domain. And each party was able to use the political resources of the branch it controlled to facilitate the reelection chances of incumbents.
Consequently pressures have been more of a nuisance than a policy determinant. If Congress has exercised somewhat more influence than in the past, its increased role hardly seems to have been dangerous. Instead, the relative openness of the American political system seems to have facilitated an adjustment of policy when executive leadership was misjudging the national interest.
These instances of congressional involvement have not been so frequent as to indicate a major shift in power from the White House to Capitol Hill. Quite aside from the resolution of specific controversies, the authority of the executive to conduct foreign policy remains largely intact. The president can still reach executive agreements with foreign countries on almost any and all issues, thereby avoiding the necessity of winning consent of two-thirds of the Senate. Also, the courts have been increasingly willing to uphold executive interpretations of congressional intent. Unless the congressional delegation of power is exceedingly detailed, limited, and explicit, members find it very difficult to challenge in court an executive interpretation of that delegation.23 Congressional delegations of authority, moreover, can no longer be hedged by a legislative veto.?' But if executive control over foreign policy has remained largely intact, even in the most partisan moments of the post-Vietnam era, it is worth considering theoretically the conditions that make this likely. To understand the relations between the branches, we must appreciate the extent to which day-to-day politics are constrained by the workings of the international system.
THE Two PRESIDENCIES
The distinction between foreign and domestic issues has long been noticed. Two decades ago, in a classic essay written under the fetching title, "The Two Presidencies," political scientist Aaron Wildavsky argued that modern presidencies were fraternal -but hardly identical -
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As mainstream a statement as the two presidency theory originally was, it became the subject of steady criticism in subsequent decades. Wildavsky's own empirical test of his generalizations -a comparison of a limited number of roll calls -was woefully inadequate. Subsequent efforts to replicate his results on a wider set of data produced inconsistent and uncertain results.29 Some of these studies suggested that the two presidency theory, though accurate enough for the Eisenhower era, did not explain the politics of foreign policy making in the years following the Vietnam war.30 Writing with Duane Oldfield, Wildavsky himself concluded that "as ideological and partisan divisions have come to reinforce each other ... foreign policy has become more like domestic policy -a realm marked by serious partisan divisions in which the president cannot count on a free ride.""3 Finally, two presidency "theory" was not much of a theory at all. It was only a set of observations about certain tendencies in American politics at a particular point in time. The structural underpinnings that might produce such a tendency were given little attention in either Wildavsky's essay or subsequent critiques.
But if two presidency theory is in disrepair, nothing very substantial has arisen to take its place. Instead, analysts of American politics are drawing few if any distinctions between foreign and domestic affairs. Instead, it is claimed that both arenas are equally likely to be the subject of partisan debate, voter interest, group activity, and legislative involvement. The president has as much -or as little -control over the one as the other. Within both arenas, the nature of the times, the skill of the participants, and the contingencies of the moment determine outcomes.
When generalizations are made about the making of foreign policy, they mainly chronicle changes that have occurred in the last quarter of a century. Congress is said to be more involved in foreign policy decisions, the process is more partisan than it used to be, the public is more attentive to and polarized by foreign policy questions, and That Morgenthau uses the appellation "statesman" rather than "politician" indicates that it is the international, not the domestic political context, that provides the context in which choices are made.
Although Kenneth Waltz's analysis is internally more consistent than Morgenthau's, its point of departure is quite similar. Waltz defines the essential characteristic of the international system as anarchic, a Hobbesian state of nature in which each nation needs to guard its autonomy and security from external threat. This threat is so great -"war may at any time break out" -that individual countries must "worry about their survival, and the worry conditions their behavior."38 The external constraints are so great that it is not necessary to understand the way in which responses to these constraints are chosen. On the contrary, trying to explain relations among countries by studying the making of foreign policy within them makes as much sense as trying to understand the fall of the Niagara River by examining the shape of a drop in its spray.
The mutual deterrence theory that guided the United States and the Soviet Union through the cold war relied almost exclusively on the assumption that the nation-state was guided by a single, rational leadership. But it is not only the members of the realist school, represented here by Morgenthau and Waltz, who have given short shrift to internal foreign policy-making processes. The assumption that nation-states are unitary actors acting rationally on behalf of the national interest has been no less important to the political economy school of thought.39 These scholars suggest that the nation-state may not be as concerned about maximizing its security as its wealth. Since the international the nation-state by the potentially anarchic quality of the international system. Wildavsky hinted at these international sources of executive power in his original essay on the two presidencies: "Compared with domestic affairs," he wrote, "presidents engaged in world politics are immensely more concerned with meeting problems on their own terms.
Who supports and opposes a policy [at home] . . . does not assume the crucial importance that it does in domestic affairs. The best policy presidents can find is also the best politics."" Policy takes precedence over politics because the international system both severely limits the sensible choices a country can make and shapes the processes by which these decisions are reached. International relations theory thus explains not only the policy choices of nations but also the existence of two presidencies.
Apart from encouraging the rise of a strong executive, what exactly are the requirements that the international system imposes on the domestic policy-making processes of a nation-state? Peter Katzenstein provides a useful point of departure for answering this question in his study of the small nations of Europe. Katzenstein points out that small countries are particularly vulnerable to changes in the international environment. Because international trade constitutes a higher percentage of their gross national product, policies must be designed carefully so that they do not adversely affect the countries' place in the international system. As a result, he says, "domestic quarrels are a luxury not tolerated in such adverse circumstances." Pointing out that "political metaphors [used by politicians in these countries] often emphasiz[e] ... that all members of society sit in the same small boat, that the waves are high, and that all must pull on the same oar," he finds that "groups are held together by the pragmatic bargains struck by a handful of political leaders at the summit. Political compromise across the main social cleavages assures political quiescence and . reinforces political control within each camp. The greater the degree of segmentation dividing these societies, the more pronounced are . arrangements which defuse conflict."45 In short, Katzenstein finds that in those countries where the international system places the greatest constraints on policy choice, there are strong pressures for elite consensus and centralized decision making.
In short, if the international system constrains the choices of the United States government, there are likely to be two presidencies. On 44Wildavsky, "The Two Presidencies," 24. 45 Katzenstein, "Small European States," 118-19.
